Killing Good Patents to Wipe out Bad Patents: Bilski, the Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter Rules, and the Inability to Save Valuable Patents Using the Reissue Statute by Van Gieson, Edward & Stellman, Paul
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 2 Article 4
2011
Killing Good Patents to Wipe out Bad Patents:
Bilski, the Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter
Rules, and the Inability to Save Valuable Patents
Using the Reissue Statute
Edward Van Gieson
Paul Stellman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Edward Van Gieson and Paul Stellman, Killing Good Patents to Wipe out Bad Patents: Bilski, the Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter
Rules, and the Inability to Save Valuable Patents Using the Reissue Statute, 27 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 403 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol27/iss2/4
KILLING GOOD PATENTS TO WIPE OUT BAD
PATENTS: BILSKI, THE EVOLUTION OF
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER RULES, AND
THE INABILITY TO SAVE VALUABLE PATENTS
USING THE REISSUE STATUTE
Edward Van Gieson and Paul Stellmant
Abstract
The Supreme Court's Bilski decision changed the rules on
patentable subject matter. This means that software and business
method inventions must be claimed in specific ways in order for a
patent to be valid. Bilski affects all software and business method
patents, including patents issued to innovative and widely admired
technology companies. As a result, many "good" patents are now
potentially invalid. The U.S. patent system includes a patent reissue
statute and long-standing reissue jurisprudence that promises patent
owners the ability to liberally correct the claims of an issued patent,
even when there has been a change in law after a patent has issued
The change in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on patentable
subject matter would not be a severe problem if the reissue statute
worked as originally intended. However, patent reissue proceedings,
as currently implemented by the United States Patent & Trademark
Office, are agonizingly slow and layered with restrictive rules. This
makes reissue impractical, and even impossible, in many situations.
Moreover, even if patents can be corrected to address Bilski, the
patent owner still loses out on the ordinary investment backed
expectations of owning an enforceable patent during lengthy reissue
proceedings. As such, there is a potential regulatory taking from
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patent owners, because they are effectively unable to use reissue to
adapt to the Supreme Court's changing rules on patentable subject
matter. Solutions are proposed for how the courts and the patent
office can apply the reissue statute to permit patent owners to restore
their valuable patent rights efficiently and effectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
The amorphous U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), has now set the stage for years of
Federal Circuit litigation defining the scope of patentable subject
matter for software and business method patents under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.1 New tests will likely be created,2 and old tests will likely be
refined. 3 In the meantime, independent inventors, small start-up
companies, multinational blue chip corporations, research
universities, and non-profits will invent new software applications
and methods of doing business over the Internet. The constantly
shifting sands of patentable subject matter will undoubtedly give their
patent attorneys headaches and will inject another level of uncertainty
into the strategic business decisions made by these enterprises.
The evolving patentable subject matter jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court results in significant changes in the legal tests for
whether a claim in a software patent is valid. Is this situation fair to
innovative companies that previously spent millions on R&D to
develop patent portfolios under then-settled law that may now be
rendered worthless by a change in the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Patent Act?
The Patent Act includes a reissue statute,4 which has been
interpreted by extensive reissue jurisprudence stating that patent
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) defines the scope of patentable subject matter: "Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title."
2. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222-23 (2010) ("In disapproving an exclusive
machine-or-transformation test, this Court by no means desires to preclude the Federal Circuit's
development of other limiting criteria that further the Patent Act's purposes and are not
inconsistent with its text.").
3. See, e.g., Research Corporation Techs. v. Microsoft, No. 01-cv-0658, slip op. (D. Az.
Jul. 28, 2009), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1037 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2009) (pending appeal in the
Federal Circuit and dealing with the "particular machine" prong of the machine-or-
transformation test).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
2011] KILLING GOOD PATENTS TO WIPE OUT BAD
owners should be given liberal leave to correct issued patents.
However, are companies able to effectively correct issued patents
when the courts change the legal tests for patentable subject matter?
Furthermore, in light of the changes in patentable subject matter
under Bilski, is the Patent Office's implementation of the reissue
statute so slow and so layered with restrictive rules that it frustrates
the effective correction of issued patents in a manner that results in a
regulatory taking of patent rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution? In short, has Bilski resulted in many "good"
patents being needlessly killed?
II. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER JURISPRUDENCE
IMPOSES ADDITIONAL NON-STATUTORY
RESTRICTIONS ON HOW SOFTWARE AND BUSINESS
METHOD INVENTIONS MAY BE CLAIMED
One of the major issues for any patent system is determining
what types of inventions are patentable, commonly known as
"patentable subject matter." Patent systems are designed to provide
incentives for individuals and companies to innovate and invest
6
money in new products and services. Many countries, however,
impose statutory limits on the types of inventions that are patentable.
For example, some countries have statutory bars against granting
7
certain types of patents for moral, humanitarian, or other reasons.
The United States patent system has few statutory limits on the
types of subject matter that are patentable. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 a
patent can be obtained for: "any new and useful process, machine,
5. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42
(1832).
6. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Co., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (noting that
"[tihe [U.S.] patent laws promote (the Progress of Science and Useful Arts] by offering a right
of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in
terms of time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have a
positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better
lives for our citizens.").
7. See, e.g., Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002. s. 4(a)
(India) (excluding from patentable subject matter "an invention the primary or intended use or
commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to public order or morality or which causes
serious prejudice to human, animal or plant life or health or to the environment"); Convention
on the Grant of European Patents, art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 ("The following
in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1: (a)
discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes,
rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games, or doing business, and programs
for computers; (d) presentations of information.").
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manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement therefor."8 The Patent Act imposes only minimal limits
on patentable subject matter.9 In particular, under 35 U.S.C. § 181,
the grant of a patent for certain types of inventions that are potentially
detrimental to national security may be barred for as long as is
required to protect the security interest.' 0
There are no statutory prohibitions in the U.S. Patent Act against
the patenting of software or business method inventions. Indeed, there
is even an explicit mention in 35 U.S.C. § 273 of methods of
conducting business in the context of infringement defenses," which
at least acknowledges the existence of patents related to business
methods.
In addition to a technical description of the invention, a patent
must include at least one claim, where an individual claim is a single
sentence description of the legal scope of what is being patented. 12
Software inventions can be claimed in any way consistent with 35
U.S.C. § 101.1 This includes claiming a process executed by
software; a machine utilizing software; and software stored on a
computer readable medium as an article of manufacture.1 4 For many
types of software and business method patents, it is the process claims
that provide the broadest protection.'5 Thus, the Patent Act, on its
8. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining the scope of patentable subject matter: "Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.").
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2010); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)
(2006) (limiting damages for certain medical procedures in some cases).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 181 ("Whenever publication or disclosure by the publication of an
application . . . might . . . be detrimental to the national security, the Commissioner of Patents
upon being so notified shall order that the invention be kept secret and shall withhold the
publication of an application . . . .").
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)( 3 ) (2006) ("the term 'method' means a method of doing or
conducting business").
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
13. See 35 U.S.C.§ 101.
14. See id.
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (defining a process as including a "process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or material."); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1981) (explaining the history of
processes as patentable subject matter and noting that their patentability is independent of any
associated machinery); ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING
4-13, 4-43 (Practicing Law Institute, 6th ed. 2010) (noting that "apparatus limitations will often
unduly limit the claim" (internal citations omitted) and describing how "[a] method of doing
business does not require inclusion of a computer, or a server, or the like apparatus in the
method claim.").
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face, permits the patenting of new uses of known processes and
machines, subject to the other statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102-103-that the invention be novel and that the "subject matter
as a whole" would have been non-obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art.
The United States has a long-standing jurisprudence limiting the
types of subject matter that are patentable.' 7 In some situations, this
might create an absolute bar to obtaining a patent. For example, a
patent cannot be obtained for the mathematical formula for a law of
nature, such as Einstein's famous formula of E=mc .8 However, for
many types of inventions, the patentable subject matter jurisprudence
has the effect of imposing restrictions on how an invention can be
claimed that is only indirectly related to whether the underlying
invention has social utility or otherwise deserves a patent.
Consider the telegraph as an example. The telegraph is in one
sense a specific "machine" for sending and receiving dots and dashes
over telegraph lines. There is also a specific process for using that
specific machine to send dots and dashes. More abstractly, the
telegraph is a means for sending information. In the case of the
telegraph, the Supreme Court held that Claim 8 of Samuel Morse's
patent was unpatentable.19 Claim 8 of Morse's patent was directed to
the use of electromotive force to send and mark a message of
intelligible characters or signs at any distance. 20 The Supreme Court
invalidated Claim 8 in part because it was not directed to a practical
application and implementation of an idea.2 1 In essence, the Supreme
Court found Claim 8 problematic because Morse was attempting to
16. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2006).
17. See, e.g., Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-93; Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
18. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-73 (invalidating an algorithm as an unpatentable
abstract idea).
19. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 62 (1853).
20. Id. at 112 ("Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts
of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-
magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters,
at any distances, being a new application of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor
or discoverer.").
21. Id. at 113 ("while he shuts the door against inventions of other persons, the patentee
would be able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties and powers of electro-
magnetism which scientific men might bring to light. For he says he does not confine his claim
to the machinery or parts of machinery, which he specifies; but claims for himself a monopoly
in its use, however developed, for the purpose of printing at a distance").
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claim the idea behind the telegraph as a general scientific principle in
terms that were too abstract and general in manner.22 However, other
claims in Morse's patent were held to be valid, including a variety of
apparatus, system, and method of use claims more closely tied to the
23
structures described in Morse's patent application.
U.S. courts have wrestled throughout the years with the
patentability of software and business methods. 24 Although there are
no special statutory limits on the patentability for software, the courts
have developed a jurisprudence that imposes additional non-statutory
restrictions on how software and business methods can be claimed so
that there are meaningful limits on the scope of the claims.25 That is,
the courts have required software and business method patents to be
claimed in specific ways in order for the claims to be valid. For
example, some types of computer implemented methods that are
essentially claiming only the use of a mathematical formula have been
found unpatentable if the field of use and post-solution activities are
so insignificant that the patent preempts application of the formula in
all fields.2 6 However, an industrial application of a mathematical
formula as part of a computer-implemented method of curing rubber
is patentable.27 There are, of course, many other doctrines that can
potentially come into play, such as non-obviousneSS28 and
definiteness. 29
22. See id. See also the United States Patent & Trademark Office's set of internal rules,
the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE,
MPEP § 706.03(a)(I)(C) (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP] ("A scientific principle,
divorced from any tangible structure, can be rejected as not within the statutory classes.
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).").
23. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 112 (noting that the first seven claims were valid).
24. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972);
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
25. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (invalidating a method for converting binary-coded
decimals to pure binary numerals as an unpatentable algorithm that was not limited to any
particular digital computer); Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (invalidating method claims directed to alarm
limits for catalytic converters as unpatentable abstract ideas and insignificant post-solution
activities); State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (creating a "useful, concrete and tangible" results test
for § 101); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (overturning State Street and
creating a "machine-or-transformation" test for patentable subject matter), aff'd on other
grounds, sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (rejecting method claims as
unpatentable abstract ideas and holding that the "machine-or-transformation" test is not an
exclusive test).
26. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-91.
27. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1980).
28. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2010).
29. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010).
2011] KILLING GOOD PATENTS TO WIPE OUT BAD
Bilski is a landmark case for software and business method
patents. The decision does not broadly bar such patents, but rather
imposes an additional layer of non-statutory restrictions on how
software and business methods must be claimed. 3 0 This may totally
bar a small class of business method innovations from being eligible
for a patent. However, more generally, the effect of Bilski on future
patents is that it imposes additional requirements for obtaining valid,
enforceable software and business method patents. For many patents
filed in the future, these additional sets of considerations will not be
an insurmountable bar to obtaining a patent. For many patents filed in
the past under a different legal regime, patentees must either hope that
their patents remain valid if challenged in court, or they must seek to
modify their patents and navigate the pitfalls of the reissue statute.
III. THE SHIFTING SANDS OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER JURISPRUDENCE: CHANGING THE RULES OF
THE GAME FOR PREVIOUSLY ISSUED PATENTS
The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court continually change
the rules on what constitutes patentable subject matter.32 On June 28,
2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark holding in Bilski v.
Kappos, which concerned the patentability of process claims under 35
U.S.C. § 101.33 The patent at issue in Bilski was a business method
for managing consumption risk-essentially a process for buyers and
sellers to hedge against the risk of price changes in commodity
markets.34 Bilski's patent was held to be invalid as an attempt to
patent an abstract idea, running afoul of the doctrine that patentable
subject matter does not include laws of nature, physical phenomena,
or abstract ideas. The Court noted that such hedging methods are
abstract ideas that have long been prevalent in the finance field.36 The
Supreme Court also rejected the Federal Circuit's earlier holding that
the "machine-or-transformation" test is the only test for determining
30. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218.
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
32. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 739
(2002) (In the context of prosecution history estoppel, Justice Kennedy notes the unfairness
involved in abruptly changing the law, where inventors had previously prosecuted their claims
under previously existing law.).
33. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218.
34. Id. at 3223-24.
35. Id. at 3231.
36. Id.
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whether a process claim is patentable subject matter.
The question remains: In rejecting Bilski's business method
claims, did the Supreme Court also invalidate valuable patents held
by the nation's most innovative companies? Is software still
patentable subject matter? And if so, under what conditions?
Bilski should be viewed in historical context as part of the
continuing evolution of the law on patentable subject matter for
software and business methods. In 1998, the Federal Circuit expanded
the scope of eligible subject matter by articulating a useful, concrete,
and tangible test in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group.3 8 In State Street, the Federal Circuit held that a
patent claiming a method of allocating assets among multiple mutual
funds was patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.3 9 The
court explained that the algorithm "produce[d] 'a useful, concrete and
tangible result'-a final share price momentarily fixed for recording
and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by
regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades."40
In October 2008, the Federal Circuit's opinion in In re Bilski
wholly rejected the State Street test and articulated the narrower
machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test for determining
eligible subject matter.4 1 Because the patent in Bilski described a
method for hedging risk that was not tied to a particular machine and
did not transform an article into a different state or thing, the claims
were ruled invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.42 The Supreme Court has
now somewhat loosened the definition of eligible subject matter while
reaffirming the unpatentability of abstract ideas. Specifically,
although the Court noted that the machine-or-transformation test is
one clue to showing that an invention constitutes patentable subject
matter, it clearly stated that the machine-or-transformation test is not
an exclusive test.4 3 However, the Supreme Court did not provide any
guidance on what other tests may be used besides the machine-or-
transformation test. In the coming years, the Federal Circuit will
almost certainly apply additional tests as it interprets the holding of
37. Id at 3225-28.
38. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
39. Id. at 1373.
40. Id.
41. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 955-56 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
42. Id at 963-66.
43. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218. 3231 (2010).
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Bilski in different cases.4
The underlying invention at issue in Bilski was a business
method where the social utility of granting a patent was questioned by
four members of the Court.45 That is, the Bilski decision is colored by
the fact that several of the Justices were opposed to business method
patents in general and to the specific type of business method patent
at issue. 46
Bilski's case was unsympathetic for other reasons. The claims of
Bilski's patent application are arguably obvious in light of the prior
art and hence undeserving of a patent on that basis alone.4 7
Additionally, Bilski's patent application had been rejected by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office as not complying with Patent Office
rules on patentable subject matter, with the patent examiner rejecting
the application as being the "manipulat[ion] [of] an abstract idea ...
without any limitations to a practical application. . .. 4 8 Bilski thus
deals with the situation of a patent applicant that should have known
that his patent application was not in comportment with Patent Office
rules at the time his patent application was filed and, moreover, never
perfected his patent application into an issued patent.4 9 Nevertheless,
Bilski has a retroactive effect on all previously issued patents, even
those for otherwise meritorious inventions in which the patent owner
complied with every Patent Office rule to obtain an issued patent.so
44. See id. ("In disapproving an exclusive machine-or-transformation test, we by no
means foreclose the Federal Circuit's development of other limiting criteria that further the
purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text."). Moreover, the Federal Circuit
is expected to rule on the patentability of subject areas outside of software and business
methods, such as medical diagnostic patents.
45. See id. at 3243 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("regardless of how one construes the term
'useful arts,' business methods are not included").
46. See id.
47. See id at 3231 (noting that "[c]laims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk: 'Hedging is a fundamental economic
practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance
class."').
48. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3233.
49. See id.
50. The Bilski Court did not limit the opinion to future patent applications; consequently,
current patent owners must review their issued patents for compliance with Bilski retroactively.
Cf Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 217 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 952 (1955) (patentee's reliance during prosecution on earlier law that was later
invalidated was an error made without deceptive intent for purposes of the patent reissue
statute); see also Gene Quinn, The Fundamental Unfairness ofRetroactively Applying Bilski, IP
WATCHDOG, January 6, 2010, http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/01/06/the-fundamental-unfairness-
of-retroactively-applying-bilski/id=8258/ (describing the unfairness of applying Bilski
retroactively to patentees that had relied on previously settled § 101 law).
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Fortunately, not every software and business method patent is of
the same questionable social utility as that in Bilski. There are
software patents that protect services developed by leading
technology companies that spend millions of dollars on research and
development. As one example, there are many patents related to
protecting innovation in the field of business intelligence, which is the
effective use of information to make business decisions.5'
Additionally, there are patents directed to covering the software
invented by social media websites, like Facebook, used by hundreds
of millions of people.52 What about software and business method
patents directed to companies and services that people admire for
their innovation? To some extent, the Bilski decision is colored by the
fact that the patentability of the underlying business method was of
dubious merit on several grounds, including obviousness.13
One of the main problems with the Bilski decision is that it
affects a wide range of issued patents including patents in fields
where there is arguably great social value towards encouraging
ingenuity. An unintended consequence of the Bilski decision is that it
punishes companies that currently hold patents issued under a
different legal regime.
IV. GOOGLE CASE STUDY
Software patents owned by many companies are potentially at
risk under Bilski. Consider Google's early patents as an illustrative
case study, which one commentator has suggested are at risk because
they do not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test.54
In September 1998, two young Stanford graduate students
moved into a small garage in Menlo Park, California, to continue
development of a search engine for their fledgling start-up, which had
just received a $100,000 investment.55 One of them, Larry Page, filed
a patent application on January 9, 1998, entitled "Method For Node
51. See, e.g., Sec. for External Sys. Mgmt., U.S. Patent No. 7,591,006 (filed Dec. 29,
2004) (issued Sep. 15, 2009) (assigned to SAP AG).
52. See, e.g., Ranking Search Results Based on the Frequency of Clicks on the Search
Results by Members of a Social Network Who Are Within a Predetermined Degree of
Separation, U.S. Patent No. 7,788,260 (filed Oct. 18, 2004) (issued Aug. 31, 2010) (assigned to
Facebook, Inc.).
53. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (noting the "long prevalen[ce]" of the subject matter of
the claims in the field of finance).
54. John F. Duffy, The Death of Google's Patents?, PATENTLY-O BLOG, July 21, 2008,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/googlepatentsl0l.pdf
55. Google History, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/corporate/milestones.html
(last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
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Ranking in a Linked Database." 6 Claim 1 of the resulting issued
patent reads as follows:
1. A computer implemented method of scoring a plurality of linked
documents, comprising:
obtaining a plurality of documents, at least some of the
documents being linked documents, at least some of the
documents being linking documents, and at least some of the
documents being both linked documents and linking
documents, each of the linked documents being pointed to by
a link in one or more of the linking documents;
assigning a score to each of the linked documents based on
scores of the one or more linking documents and
processing the linked documents according to their scores.
The '999 Patent is now a foundational patent for Google, Inc.,
which presently has a market capitalization of over $150 billion.5 8
This patent generally covers Google's PageRank search methodology,
the process used to sort and rank websites using the company's
famous search engine.59 Put simply, the claims recite: (1) obtaining
"linked" and/or "linking" documents; (2) assigning a score to the
"linked" documents; and (3) "processing the linked documents
according to their scores." 60
Legal commentators have suggested that Claim 1 of the '999
patent is not tied to a particular machine and does not generate an
output that would satisfy the machine-or-transformation test.6 1
However, the machine-or-transformation test is not an exclusive test
anymore.6 2 Thus, even assuming that the legal commentators are
correct in stating that Claim 1 does not satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test, there might still be legal arguments that Claim I
would be found valid in the future if courts develop additional tests
56. U.S. Patent Appl. No. 09/004,827. The resulting issued patent is assigned to Stanford
University, and has been exclusively licensed by Google until at least 2011. Google, Inc.,
Registration Statement (Form S-1), 67 (Apr. 29, 2004), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/dsl.html.
57. U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 col.8 1.55-68 (filed Jan. 9, 1998) (issued Sept. 4, 2001)
[hereinafter '999 Patent].
58. See, e.g., Google Finance, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/finance/?q=google
(last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
59. See Duffy, supra note 54, at 2 (citing Google, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-
1), supra note 56, at 65).
60. See '999 Patent, supra note 57, col.8 1.55-68.
61. See Duffy, supra note 54, at 3-4.
62. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
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for patentable subject matter.
One additional consideration is that the Bilski Court may have
also increased the vulnerability of certain types of software patents
under the abstract ideas doctrine. The abstract ideas doctrine is
intended to prevent the patenting of fundamental principles that
would wholly preempt the public's access to specific fields. That is,
one cannot patent a mathematical formula if the claims would
preempt all applications of the mathematical formula in other fields. 4
Bilski's patent was criticized as pre-empting risk hedging in all
fields. 6 5 However, Justice Stevens' concurrence noted that the Bilski
Court's decision might be interpreted as including "language that
could suggest a shift in our approach to that issue." 6 6 Among other
things, Justice Stevens observed that the Court "discounts the [patent]
application's discussion of what sorts of data to use, and how to
analyze those data, as mere 'token postsolution components." 6 7
Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that the Court artificially limited
Bilski's claims to hedging instead of considering the term as applying
to a "category of processes including petitioners' claims."68
In at least two recent post-Bilski Federal Circuit decisions, the
court interpreted the abstract ideas doctrine rather narrowly. 6 9 While
these two recent cases narrowly construed the exceptions to § 101, the
Federal Circuit did not announce any new tests for patentable subject
matter. 7 0 Moreover, given Justice Stevens' concerns, patent owners
still live under a cloud of uncertainty until the Supreme Court revisits
the abstract ideas doctrine. Indeed, one of the first district courts
63. See id. at 3229.
64. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (invalidating a claim that
"would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on
the algorithm itself').
65. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
66. Id. at 3235. (Stevens, J., concurring).
67. Id.
68. Id
69. See Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868-69 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (concluding that, because "[t]he invention presents functional and palpable applications in
the field of computer technology," a method for halftoning gray scale images was a statutory
process, even though the asserted claims did not explicitly recite a computer or other machine);
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(holding that claims directed to methods for determining the optimal dosage of drugs to treat
autoimmune diseases fell within § 101, because (1) the claims were applications of "a patent-
eligible application of naturally occurring correlations" and thus did not pre-empt all uses of the
correlations, and (2) claimed treatment methods met the transformation prong of the machine-
or-transformation test).
70. See id.
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applying Bilski has indeed interpreted the decision as signaling a shift
in the abstract idea doctrine. On August 13, 2010, the district court of
Central California in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, invalidated
U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 ("the '545 Patent") under the holding of
Bilski." The '545 Patent has method claims related to a method of
delivering media products over the Internet. 7 2 The Ultramercial court
observed:
the '545 patent is the basic idea that one can use advertisement as
an exchange or currency. An Internet user can pay for copyrighted
media by sitting through a sponsored message instead of paying
money to download the media. This core principle, similar to the
core of the Bilski patent, is an abstract idea.
The Ultramercial court then found that other limitations of the
claims were not sufficient to avoid preemption in other fields.74 In
particular, the Ultramercial court stated that, "similar to the patent in
Bilski, the added features, examples, or limitations of the '545 patent
do not make it patentable. . . . If the claimed invention here were
patentable, it would 'preempt use of this [method] in all fields."' 75
Assuming that Justice Stevens' concern regarding a shift by the
Supreme Court is correct and assuming that other courts follow the
example of the district court in Ultramercial, a wider range of
software patents are potentially invalid under the abstract ideas
doctrine. In the case of Google's patents, consider the implications
if a similar approach was applied based on the concern expressed by
Justice Stevens. In such an analysis, limitations in Google's patent
related to the type of data to use and how to analyze the data would be
discounted. Additionally, the claims would be interpreted in their
broadest sense possible when considering whether the claims preempt
applications of searching in other fields.7
Is Google's '999 Patent potentially at risk under the abstract
71. Ultramercial v Hulu, No. 09-06918 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010).
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. It is noted that future Federal Circuit decisions may clarify whether Justice Stevens
was correct regarding a possible shift in the interpretation of the abstract ideas doctrine such that
the potential risk to Google's patents may change dramatically as the courts evolve the
interpretation of the abstract ideas doctrine.
77. Note also that Justice Stevens expressed a concern, not a certainty, about how the
language of the Court might be interpreted as a shift on the abstract ideas doctrine. See Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3257 (2010).
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ideas doctrine when viewed in the harsh light of Justice Stevens'
comments that the Court might have used language signaling a
change in the abstract ideas doctrine? The recited language of Claim I
in the '999 Patent is rather broad; besides covering Google's
innovative search technology, the language of the claim might
arguably also be interpreted as preempting the manual acts of
"scoring a plurality of linked documents," particularly if the field of
use in the preamble ("computer implemented method") and the post-
solution activities ("processing") are discounted.78 In the case of the
'999 Patent, the specification states that links are essentially the same
thing as citations such that a linked database can include "any
database of documents containing mutual citations, such as . .. a
database of academic articles . . . or court cases."79 While the '999
Patent provides examples of scoring using advanced mathematical
techniques, it also provides examples of evaluating the rank of
citations by institution, geographic location, unusually important
source locations, and weighting back citations from highly ranked
links.so
In short, if Claim 1 is interpreted in a manner suggested by
Justice Stevens' comments in Bilski to discount various aspects of the
claim, then Claim 1 of the '999 Patent includes steps that preempt a
law student from performing a manual search and ranking technique
to analyze citations in a set of books, law review articles, or court
cases, and then subsequently ranking the documents by hand. For
instance, Claim 1 would read on a law student who visited the law
library to sort through the most relevant literature on a particular legal
subject. To infringe this claim, for example, the student might visit
the library and physically retrieve three textbooks: book A (a linking
document that cites book B), book B (both a linked document cited by
book A and a linking document that cites book C), and book C (a
linked document cited by book B). Upon obtaining these three books,
the student might then "score" linked documents B and C and
subsequently "process" them by hand in her notebook. Claim 1 of the
'999 Patent, construed according to its plain language, could therefore
be infringed by manual acts performed by a law student. Just as
Bilski's method for hedging risks was held to be an abstract idea,
78. Note that the "computer implemented method" language is a statement of use within
the preamble and under current USPTO policy would not likely be given patentable weight. See
MPEP, supra note 22, at § 2106(II)(c).
79. '999 Patent, supra note 57, col.3 1.56-59.
80. See id. at col.7 1.1-27.
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Claim 1 of Google's '999 Patent, in the worst case, risks invalidation
because the claimed PageRank method "would pre-empt use of this
approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an
abstract idea."81
Yet, Google's patent counsel could not have reasonably foreseen
these developments. For instance, when Google's '999 Patent was
prosecuted from 1998 until 2001, State Street governed the scope of
patentable subject matter. The liberal State Street requirements-that
the subject matter be useful, concrete, and tangible 8 2-would easily
be met by Claim 1 of Google's '999 Patent. In Claim 1, for example,
linked documents are scored based on the "linking" documents, and
are subsequently stored based on those scores.83 The end result of
Google's algorithm is quite "useful, concrete and tangible"-a list of
sorted documents on the search engine's website. Indeed, the
prosecuting patent attorneys likely were quite confident that the
search engine's claims were much more of a patentable process than
the State Street business method claims that were upheld.
Google's patent position changed overnight when Bilski was
decided on appeal by the Federal Circuit in October 2008.84 Method
claims like Claim 1 of the '999 Patent do not recite any particular
machine (the "computer-implemented method" language appears in
the preamble as a statement of intended use and is not given
patentable weight), and the "linked documents" are not articles that
are transformed into a different state or thing. 86 Even though the
Supreme Court loosened the Federal Circuit's § 101 tests, as
demonstrated previously, Google's method claims still risk being
invalidated as an unpatentable abstract idea. Google must now
attempt to read the tea leaves of the Supreme Court's decision and
guess how the law will change going forward as the issue is litigated
in the Federal Circuit and district courts over the next several years.
While Google may have been very successful even without this
particular patent, the company clearly values its patent portfolio. As
81. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. Also see Duffy, supra note 54, at 2, for a thorough
analysis of the patentability of the '999 Patent under the Federal Circuit's test in Bilski.
82. State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
83. '999 Patent, supra note 57, col.8 1.55-68.
84. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
85. See MPEP, supra note 22, at § 2111.02 (11).
86. Claims 18-19 of the '999 Patent instead recite a "computer-readable medium" and are
therefore more likely to remain valid even under the machine-or-transformation test, however
the other 27 method claims are vulnerable under Bilski. See '999 Patent, supra note 57, col. 10
1.18-19.
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Google's S-1 filing illustrates, "[a]ny significant impairment of our
intellectual property rights could harm our business or our ability to
compete."8 Moreover, a recent study of patents and entrepreneurship
found that start-ups often use patents to build and maintain their
competitive advantage. 8 Because investors expect their portfolio
companies to protect their intellectual property, many start-ups, like
Google in the late 1990s, aggressively seek patent protection for
strategic purposes, regardless of whether they have a marketable
product to sell.89 Any significant shifts in patent law would therefore
alter the strategic calculus of investors such as venture capitalists,
which might have a chilling effect on new investments. To prevent
their investor-backed growth strategies from being frustrated by rapid
changes in patent law, start-ups must strive to ensure that their patent
portfolio remains valid. 90
The value of a patent encompasses many factors. These include
the potential upside value, in terms of damages and other benefits, to
a company if the patent is successfully asserted. The present value of
a patent, however, is discounted by any litigation risks involved in
asserting the patent that will significantly increase the costs and
reduce the odds of winning a patent lawsuit. As a result, even if the
result of Bilski is only an elevated risk that a particular software
patent might be found invalid if litigated, the potential value of that
patent is decreased.
Is it fair for innovative companies to lose patent rights when
there has been a change in law regarding the definition of patentable
subject matter? Patents are considered to be a form of social
bargain.91 The patent statute requires the patent owner to disclose
technical information in the patent sufficient for others to make and
use the invention.92 In return, the patent owner is granted a limited
monopoly to the invention. 9 3 In the case of Google's '999 Patent,
87. See Google, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-I), supra note 56, at 9.
88. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results ofthe 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1288 (2010).
89. See id. at 1296.
90. See Paul R. Michel & Henry R. Nothhaft, Inventing Our Way Out ofJoblessness,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2010), www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/opinion/06nothhaft.html?_r-2&pag
(citing Berkeley Patent Survey and noting that "[t]hree-fourths of executives at venture capital-
backed startups say patents are vital to getting financing").
91. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
92. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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details of a computer implemented search technology to rank
documents are disclosed in the patent. 94 The owners of the '999
Patent have kept their part of the social bargain by disclosing details
of Google's page ranking technology. 95 Additionally, the '999 Patent
was otherwise properly obtained from the Patent Office at a time
when the useful, concrete, and tangible test of State Street was good
law. 9 6 Yet, in light of the Bilski decision, the value of the '999 Patent
is now at risk.
While individual claims of Google's '999 Patent are potentially
at risk of being invalidated, one of the interesting things about the
'999 Patent is that the technical description in the '999 Patent
describes various features that might satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test, and, theoretically, these features would have been
disclosed and enabled under 35 U.S.C. § 112. For example, the '999
Patent provides a technical description of returning a search result to a
user using a search engine and a computer system having a web
crawler that explores the web and creates an index of web content. 9 7
Thus, in theory, all of the claims of the '999 Patent could have been
written in a manner that would have been comparatively safe under
the current legal tests for patentable subject matter. 98
Google is, of course, only one example of a company that played
by the rules and filed patents that were valid when issued. Many
innovative companies have issued software patents where there is a
risk that the claims do not satisfy the safe-harbor of the machine-or-
transformation test. 99 If Justice Stevens is correct that the Supreme
Court might have signaled a shift in the abstract ideas doctrine, there
is also an increased risk that many of these same software patents are
potentially invalid under the abstract ideas doctrine.
94. See generally '999 Patent, supra note 57.
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring adequate disclosure of the scope of the invention).
96. State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed Cir. 1998), was decided in
1998, and the '999 Patent was prosecuted between 1998 and 2001.
97. '999 Patent, supra note 57, col.8 1.6-20.
98. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3235 (2010) (noting that "the machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether
some claimed inventions are processes under § 101").
99. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,845,300 (filed June 5, 1996) (issued Dec. 1, 1998)
(Microsoft); U.S. Patent No. 7,788,260 (filed Oct. 18, 2004) (issued Aug. 31, 2010) (Facebook);
U.S. Patent No. 6,067,540 (filed Feb. 28, 1997) (issued May 23, 2000) (Oracle Corp).
420 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
V. THE REISSUE STATUTE: AN EQUITABLE REMEDY IN
THEORY BUT AN INEQUITABLE QUAGMIRE IN
PRACTICE
What can enterprises do to remedy claims that are at a high risk
of being invalidated by changes in the law? The U.S. patent system
includes a reissue statute, 35 U.S.C. § 251, which is specifically
intended to give a patent owner means to correct issued patents so that
a patent owner does not unnecessarily lose valuable rights for errors
made without deceptive intent.100 The use of reissue to correct a
patent is a long-standing feature of the U.S patent system. For
example, several of Samuel Morse's telegraph patents were reissued
to correct the patents.o10
The Federal Circuit explains that the reissue statute is "remedial
in nature and is based on fundamental principles of equity and
fairness."l 02 In theory, a patent owner with a well-written patent is
able to liberally correct the claims of an issued patent to maintain the
value of the patent in the face of changes in law. On its face, the
reissue statute of 35 U.S.C. § 251 permits patent owners with liberal
leave to correct the claims of their issued patents if errors are
identified in the claims that render them invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.'03 35 U.S.C. § 251 states:
[w]henever any patent [that] is, through error without any
deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or
invalid . . . by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he
had a right to claim in the patent, the Director shall, on the
surrender of such patent and the payment of the fee required by
law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the original
patent, and in accordance with a new and amended application, for
the unexpired part of the term of the original patent. 04
The reissue statute imposes only a few limitations on the ability
of a patent owner to correct the claims of an issued patent to address
changes in the interpretation of patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101. First, the error must been made without any deceptive
100. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). By contrast, Certificates of Correction are intended for
correcting clerical or typographical errors, such as spelling errors. See 35 U.S.C. § 255 (2000).
Reexamination procedures are suited for an expensive, thorough review of a patent's validity
based on new prior art references. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (2000).
101. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 82-83 (1853).
102. Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1439 n.28 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
103. See 35 U.S.C. § 251.
104. Id.
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intention. o0 A patent owner has strong incentives to obtain patents
that are valid when issued. Moreover, the Patent Office is supposed to
check that the claims comply with 35 U.S.C. § 101 at the time the
patent is examined by the Patent Office. 0 6 As a result, it would
normally be expected that a patent can be corrected by reissue to
address a later change in the law of patentable subject matter. Second,
no new matter can be introduced by reissue.10 7 This means that any
amended claims in a reissue patent must be supported by the technical
description in the original patent. Thus, for example, if the original
patent described a particular machine, the process claims could be
amended to be tied to that machine because the technical description
in the original patent supports such an amendment. Third, the scope
of the claims cannot be enlarged unless the reissue application is filed
within two years of the issue date of the original patent.' 0 In practice,
a patentee wishing to seek a reissue patent will file with the USPTO,
inter alia, a copy of the specification and drawings (with no new
matter), the claims (including amendments), and a reissue oath that
points out an error made without deceptive intent. 109
The reissue statute thus permits a patent owner to liberally
correct a claim of an issued patent that is invalid for any reason
except for deceptive action by the patent owner.1 0 As Chief Justice
Marshall noted in an early reissue case, the "interest and policy of
every enlightened government" is to promote the progress of science
and useful arts."' Chief Justice Marshall continued by explaining that
justice pleads against depriving an inventor of the compensation and
reward that they deserve for their patent:
[I]t cannot be doubted that the settled purpose of the United States
has ever been, and continues to be, to confer on the authors of
useful inventions an exclusive right in their inventions for the time
mentioned in their patent. It is the reward stipulated for the
advantages derived by the public for the exertions of the
individual, and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions. The
laws which are passed to give effect to this purpose ought, we
think, to be construed in the spirit in which they have been made;
and to execute the contract fairly on the part of the United States,
105. Id.
106. MPEP, supra note 22, at § 2106(IV).
107. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
108. Id.
109. See MPEP, supra note 22, §§ 1400-90.
110. See 35 U.S.C. § 251.
111. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241 (1832).
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where the full benefit has been actually received: if this can be
done without transcending the intention of the statute, or
countenancing acts which are fraudulent or may prove
mischievous. The public yields nothing which it has not agreed to
yield; it receives all which it has contracted to receive. The full
benefit of the discovery, after its enjoyment by the discoverer for
fourteen years, is preserved; and for his exclusive enjoyment of it
during that time the public faith is pledged. That sense of justice
and of right which all feel, pleads strongly against depriving the
inventor of the compensation thus solemnly promised, because he
has committed an inadvertent or innocent mistake. 112
In the past, courts have sanctioned the use of reissue to correct
claims rendered invalid by a change of law."' For example, in Moist
Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co.,11 4 the patentee's original
issued patent was invalidated by the later Supreme Court decision in
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker for failing to
adequately describe the means employed in the asserted claims."s
The patentee subsequently filed for reissue "on the ground that the
original patent had been declared invalid as functional, and that such a
decision could not have been foreseen when the patent was
obtained."ll 6 The Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of the reissue
patent because "the purpose of a reissue is to protect a patentee's right
to receive the benefits of his invention . . . ."1
In practice, however, it is difficult for patent owners to use the
reissue statute in an effective manner to handle continual changes in
the courts' definition of patentable subject matter. This creates a
patent correction crisis for patent owners, who face an unnecessary
and irrational loss in the value of their patent portfolios every time the
courts change the rules of the game on patentable subject matter.
112. Id. at 241-42 (emphasis added). See also Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429,
1439 n.28 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that "[r]eissue is remedial in nature and is based on
fundamental principles of equity and fairness").
113. 4A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 15.03 (2010).
114. See Moist Cold Refrigerator v. Lou Johnson Co., 217 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
I 15. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
116. Moist Cold Refrigerator, 217 F.2d at 40.
117. Id. at 43-44. See also CHISUM, supra note 113, at § 15.03 (citing In Re Richman, 409
F.2d 269 (C.C.P.A. 969)); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Roberts Chem., Inc., 245 F.2d 693 (4th Cir.
1957) (upholding a reissue patent that took advantage of legal changes after the issuance of the
original patent).
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A. Long Pendency Devalues Reissued Patents
An unrecognized problem with the Bilski decision is that the
correction procedures of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) are inadequate to deal with rapid changes by the
courts in the definition of eligible subject matter. In practice, a patent
owner faces severe problems in correcting patents to deal with
changes in the courts' interpretation of patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Patent Office regulations mandate that reissue
applications be "examined in the same manner as a non-reissue, non-
provisional application" and that patent examiners act on reissue
applications "in advance of other applications."' 18 The USPTO's
correction procedures are exceedingly slow, however, with one
commentator estimating an average pendency of five years from the
start to the finish of reissue proceedings." 9 In the authors' experience,
reissue proceedings can drag for as long as ten years if the case is
appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences or the
Federal Circuit. 120
The five-to-ten years required for reissue proceedings is simply
so long that many patents are uncorrectable by reissue under 35
U.S.C. § 251, thus eradicating much or all of a patent's value when
the courts change the interpretation of patentable subject matter. A
patent has maximum patent term of twenty years from the date of
filing, subject to minor exceptions.121 Viewed from the perspective of
total patent lifetime, reissue proceedings that last for five to ten years
can therefore consume 25-50% of the maximum term.
This estimated percentage is misleading for several reasons.
First, it often takes three or more years for a patent to issue, such that
issued patents are typically in force for no more than about seventeen
years.122 In individual cases, it is not unheard of for a patent to spend
up to seven years before the Patent Office before finally coming to
issue. Moreover, the 20-year maximum term of a continuation
118. 37 C.F.R. § 1.176(a) (2002).
119. Dennis Crouch, Reissue Applications over Time, PATENTLY-O BLOG, Aug. 23, 2009,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/08/reissue-applications-over-time-1.html.
120. See, e.g., Reissue Application No. 10/016,750, which was filed on Dec. 10, 2001, and
remains pending almost a decade later in the Federal Circuit. See In re Mostafazadeh, No. 10-
1260, appeal docketed (Fed. Cir. March 24, 2010).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
122. See Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010, USPTO.GOV,
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf (last visited Jan. 29,
2011).
123. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (filed May 29, 2001).
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patent is with respect to the filing date of its parent patent, with the
result that many continuation patents are in force for much shorter
periods.124 In practice, a typical continuation patent strategy is to wait
until a parent patent application is about to issue before filing a
continuation patent claiming priority to the parent patent.125 Thus, the
twenty-year maximum is shortened by the cumulative time the parent
patent application and the continuation are examined by the Patent
Office. And, as explained above, an individual patent can easily spend
anywhere from three to seven years being examined by the Patent
Office. As a result, it is fairly common for individual patents to issue
with only ten to fifteen years of enforceable term. In that context,
reissue proceedings that take five-to-ten years could wipe out much of
the maximum possible enforceable term of an issued patent.
Second, a company with a portfolio of patents typically has
patents with a range of remaining terms. For example, if a company
began to file patents after the 1998 State Street decision and
continued to file patents through the final decision by the Bilski Court,
then the portfolio has filing dates spread apart by more than a decade
with a corresponding range in remaining patent terms. Individual
patents may very well be uncorrectable in that the remaining term of
some patents in the portfolio may be less than typical lengths of time
to pursue reissue proceedings and any appeals. For example, Google's
'999 Patent will expire in January 2018.126 If a reissue were filed in
2011, the reissue would likely remain in prosecution until at least
2016 or 2017,127 leaving only one or two years of enforceability. If
reissue is filed any later, there would likely be no remaining patent
term.
Third, the long pendency of reissue proceedings increases the
possibility that the patent's value is diminished under 35 U.S.C. § 252
by what is known as "the doctrine of intervening rights."l 2 8 The
doctrine of intervening rights is related to the equitable rights of
parties to continue to perform acts after the grant of the reissue
124. MPEP, supra note 22, at § 201.07; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
125. Consider a patent that issued after three years, and a continuation is filed just prior to
issuance. If the continuation takes another three years to issue, then its effective remaining term
would only be fourteen years, since the twenty years is measured from the priority date of the
parent patent under 35 U.S.C. § 154.
126. '999 Patent, supra note 57. Filed on Jan. 9, 1998, the '999 Patent will expire on Jan.
9, 2018. Id.
127. See Crouch, supra note 119.
128. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2006).
2011] KILLING GOOD PATENTS TO WIPE OUT BAD
patent.12 9 Intervening rights arise if the reissue claims that are granted
are significantly different than the original patent claims and
competitors make at least "substantial preparation .. . before the grant
of the reissue" to perform acts that would infringe a claim of the
reissue patent. 130 Under the doctrine of intervening rights, the
infringer may seek relief from a court for the "equitable . .. protection
of investments made or business commenced before the grant of the
reissue."l31 As an illustrative example, suppose that a company owns
a pioneer patent in a business field that is just beginning to take off. In
this example, we will assume that all of the issued claims in the
original patent have questionable validity under Bilski such that none
of the claims that emerge from reissue will correspond exactly to an
issued claim of the original patent. The company might have a reissue
patent granted five or more years in the future after the reissue
application is filed. During those five years, competitors may enter
the same business space and make investments or open businesses. If
the reissue claims are significantly different from those in the original
patent, then the competitors may seek equitable relief under 35 U.S.C.
§ 252 if the patent owner tries to assert the reissue patent. In the
previous example of Google's '999 Patent, suppose that a reissue
application is filed in 2011 and a reissue patent is granted in 2016 to
leave two years of enforceability. Two years of enforceable term
would still, in theory, permit the patent to be asserted for two years
worth of future damages or injunctive relief. Any search engine
company in existence prior to the 2016 grant of the reissue patent,
however, could attempt to seek equitable relief under the doctrine of
intervening rights to continue to practice any claim in the reissue
patent that was not present in the original patent.
The five-to-ten years required for reissue proceedings thus
creates the situation that many patents are simply uncorrectable, in
any practical sense, to deal with the courts' evolving patentable
subject matter jurisprudence. For patents with a short remaining term
it may simply be impossible to use reissue to correct the patent by
reissue in light of typical reissue pendency. Moreover, in many
situations the doctrine of intervening rights may result in a reissue
patent that cannot be equitably enforced against competitors that
made investments or commenced business in the same space before
the conclusion of reissue proceedings.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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B. Diminished Past Damages IfReissue Patent Is Not For A
"Substantially Identical" Invention
Another aspect of the value of a patent is the right to collect
damages for infringement. The filing of a reissue application can also
result in a patent owner losing rights to past damages. A patent owner
usually seeks past damages whenever possible, i.e., damages for any
infringement that occurred prior to filing of a patent lawsuit.132 One
of the benefits of process claims is that the patentee does not have to
mark products or provide notice prior to suit to collect damages for up
to six years prior to suit. 133 But one of the dangers of reissue
proceedings to correct 35 U.S.C. § 101 issues is that the patent owner
risks losing rights to all past damages prior to the issue date of the
reissue patent.134 This is due to 35 U.S.C. § 252's requirement that
"the claims of the original and reissued patents [must be] substantially
identical" in order for the patent owner to be able to collect past
damages for infringement taking place before the issue date of the
reissued patent.' 35 In order to address invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §
101, a patent owner would typically have to amend the claims during
reissue in a significant manner, such as by tying the process claims to
a particular machine or adding an additional limitation that satisfies
the transformation test. Such significant changes to the claims may
result in a change in claim scope, because the "standard applied is that
of whether a particular change to the claims is substantive, such that
the scope of the claims is no longer substantially identical." 36
Arguably, adding a limitation (such as adding additional method steps
to transform the state of an article to satisfy the "transformative"
prong of the machine-or-transformation test) to remedy § 101
concerns would result in such a substantive amendment to the claims.
Consider a claim directed to a high-definition television receiver
where the claim recites process steps directed to a signal processing
algorithm used inside the television receiver to process encoded
HDTV signals. In this example, assume that the issued claim recites
no real-world outputs satisfying the transformation test and is not tied
132. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 286 (2006).
133. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
134. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (requiring that the reissue claims be "substantially identical" to
the original claims in order to "have effect continuously from the date of the original patent").
Thus, if a claim is not "substantially identical," damages would not accrue from the original
issue date. Id.
135. 35 U.S.C. § 252.
136. Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
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to a specific machine. Adding limitations in reissue directed to
converting the signal into a displayable format and displaying the
high-definition format on a television display screen might satisfy the
machine-or-transformation test, but it would also significantly narrow
the scope of the original signal processing claims. Here, the reissue
claim would not have substantially the same scope as the original
claim. 137 Thus, in addition to other problems, a patent owner that
attempts to use reissue to correct an issued patent for 35 U.S.C. § 101
issues risks losing rights to all past damages for the entire time period
prior to the conclusion of the reissue proceedings.
Why are rights to past damages so important? First, for many
patents, the remaining term of the patent may be so short that the
patent will have little remaining term when reissue proceedings are
completed.138 Second, the five or more years required by reissue are
an eternity in many industries. The industry may have moved in a
different direction during this time period such that the only damages
that remain are for past damages. Third, the status of reissue
proceedings is posted on the Patent Office website.139 Competitors
have years to design around any patent undergoing reissue
proceedings. Thus, by the time reissue proceedings are completed, a
company's competitors will have had ample time to design around
any reissue patent.
C. Non-Statutory Reissue Declaration and Potential Estoppel
Issue
Even if a patent has many years of remaining term, filing a
reissue application to address 35 U.S.C. § 101 patentable subject
matter issues can destroy much of the value of an issued patent. One
aspect of the value of a patent is the right to pursue injunctive relieve
to stop competitors from infringing a patent. Under 35 U.S.C. § 283,
the owner of a patent has the right to exclude others from making or
using the patented invention by seeking an injunction.14 0
Unfortunately, the mere filing of a reissue application to address
35 U.S.C. § 101 issues may in some cases dissuade a patent owner
from filing suit during reissue proceedings, because the Patent Office
137. See id.
138. See Crouch, supra note 119 (discussing the extremely long pendency for PTO reissue
procedures).
139. See U.S.P.TO. Patent Application Information Retrieval, USPTO.Gov,
http://portal.uspto.gov/extemal/portal/pair (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
140. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
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requires the patent owner to submit a reissue declaration pointing out
at least one specific error for which correction is being sought during
reissue. 141 Note that while the statute itself refers to an "error," there
is no statutory requirement for a reissue declaration; 142 the
requirement merely arises from USPTO rules and procedures.14 3
Nevertheless, the reissue declaration required by the Patent
Office creates a potential estoppel issue. If a patent owner files a
reissue declaration stating that the error is that the claims are invalid
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in light of Bilski, then the patent owner has
conceded that the claims of the original patent are invalid, which may
create an estoppel that a defendant can use in court against the patent
owner if a patent lawsuit is filed while the reissue proceedings are
pending. 144 As a result, the mere filing of a reissue application can in
some cases bar a patent owner from pursuing injunctive relief for
many years, even if there was otherwise a colorable legal basis for
asserting the patent. This situation might arise in the current legal
environment if, for example, a patent has claims that fail the machine-
or-transformation test. As noted above, the machine-or-transformation
test is not an exclusive test, and a patent owner might want to reserve
the option of asserting such a patent in litigation and arguing to a
court that the patent is valid under an alternate basis. In this situation,
filing a reissue declaration potentially converts a patent having a risk
of invalidity into one in which the patent owner has conceded that the
original claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
D. Inflexible Non-Statutory Patent Office Rules
The reissue statute permits "reissue of the patent for the
invention disclosed in the original patent" when there is "error
without any deceptive intention."l 4 5 The statute also states that
provisions of the Patent Act relating to applications for patents apply
to reissue of a patent, except for minor exceptions.14 6 The Patent
141. MPEP, supra note 22, at § 1402 ("Absent a statement that the patent for which
reissue is sought is wholly or partly inoperative or invalid in that one or more patent claims
is/are too broad, or a statement specifying and correcting some other (proper) 35 U.S.C. 251
error that renders the patent wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, such reissue applications do
not recite an error within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 251.").
142. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
143. MPEP, supra note 22, at § 1402.
144. See id. The oath is thus part of the prosecution history, which is relied upon by the
public. See also MPEP, supra note 22, at § 1470 (rule requiring that reissue applications be open
to inspection by the public).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
146. See id.
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Office has implemented its own internal procedural rules based on the
Patent Office's interpretation of these provisions of the reissue statute.
These additional non-statutory rules make it difficult to correct
patents by reissue. For a patent that has been issued more than two
years (a "narrowing reissue") the reissue statute does not permit
enlarging the scope of the claims. 14 7 However, the Patent Office
interprets any removal of a claim limitation as an enlargement of the
scope of the claim.148 That is, Patent Office rules provide essentially
no flexibility to pursue reissue claims in a narrowing reissue that
remove a single limitation, even if other limitations are added such
that, in an equitable sense, the claim has not been enlarged. For a
narrowing reissue, a patent owner is typically permitted to only add
additional narrowing limitations.149 However, this might result in a
claim that be worthless to the patent owner, since the narrowing
limitations must also be supported by the technical description of the
patent, and the claim as a whole would have to fall under a safe
harbor of the Patent Office for 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Patent Office also has other rules that impose hurdles on
using reissue to correct claims. One rule is that the reissue application
must be for the same general invention.150 Thus, it is conceivable that
if the claims change too much during reissue, the Patent Office will
issue a rejection. In particular, the Patent Office rules state that the
reissue claims are for the same general invention if:
(A) the claims presented in the reissue application are described in
the original patent specification and enabled by the original patent
specification such that 35 U.S.C. § 112 first paragraph is satisfied;
and (B) nothing in the original patent specification indicates an
intent not to claim the subject matter of the claims presented in the
reissue application. 151
The first requirement relates to the written description and
enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112-that the patent
specification support the subject matter of the reissue claims.15 2 But
note the potential strictness of the second non-statutory requirement
147. Id.
148. See MPEP § 1412.03(1) (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) ("A broadened reissue claim is a
claim which enlarges the scope of the claims of the patent, i.e., a claim which is greater in scope
than each and every claim of the original patent.").
149. See id. at § 1412.03.
150. Id. at § 1412.01; In re Amos, 953 F.2d 613, 618, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
151. See MPEP, supra note 22, at § 1412.01.
152. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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that "nothing . .. indicates an intention not to claim the subject matter
of the claims in the reissue application."' 5 3 Suppose, for example, that
the patentee provided a drawing in the original patent application
showing the software module in a computer system, but that the text
of the patent application includes a statement that in a preferred mode
the invention is not tied to any particular machine and is best used
outside of the computer system shown and illustrated. Arguably, the
original patent application might be interpreted as indicating an
intention not to claim the process tied to the computer system shown
and illustrated in the patent application.15 4 In this situation, there is a
potential risk during reissue that amending process claims to tie them
to the system that is illustrated in the patent application might be
considered to be outside of the Patent Office's rules that the reissue
claims be directed to the same "general invention" of the original
patent.
Another Patent Office rule is that a reissue cannot be used to
obtain claims that could have been obtained in a divisional filing.'55 A
divisional patent is a patent filed in response to a finding by the Patent
Office that the original as-filed claims describe more than one
invention.' 56 The reissue statute does not explicitly bar such a reissue
strategy. However, the Patent Office's position is that there is no
"error" under the reissue statute when a patentee attempts to use
reissue to pursue claims that could have been pursued in a divisional
application. 57 Thus, if a patent is filed with twenty claims, the Patent
Office may issue a restriction requirement for a subset of these, such
as for ten of the claims. The patent owner then has the option of filing
a divisional application for the restricted claims, but only while the
original patent application (or other closely related application) is
pending.'5 8 After the original application issues as a patent, the right
to file a divisional patent is typically lost. 159 Thus, there are situations
where a patent owner during the original patent prosecution may have
thought it safe not to pursue a divisional patent. In this situation the
153. See MPEP, supra note 22, at § 1412.01.
154. Note also the parallels to the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The
specification . . . shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention."). A patentee would be barred in reissue from seeking claims directed to, for
example, a transformation (under the "machine-or-transformation" test) if the patent did not
teach the best mode for implementing the additional limitations being added. Id
155. See MPEP, supra note 22, at § 1412.01.
156. See id. at § 201.06.
157. See id. at § 1412.01.
158. See id. at § 201.06.
159. Id. (noting that divisional patents are carved out of pending applications).
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patent owner is barred during reissue from pursuing the subject matter
of the restricted claims during reissue. Where the restricted claims
had precisely the types of limitations needed to satisfy the legal test
for patentable subject matter, the patent owner would face a
procedural bar to correcting their patent during reissue.
The Patent Office's rule against pursuing reissue claims that
could have been obtained in a divisional application might arguably
be reasonable for the situation that a patentee was attempting to use
reissue to obtain additional claims that could have been obtained in
the original prosecution. In a regime in which the court's
interpretation of patentable subject matter changes slowly over time, a
patentee in the original prosecution can gauge the scope of the
allowed claims and choose to file a divisional patent application if
they believe they need additional claim coverage. Here, the outcome
for not filing a divisional application can be reasonably foreseen (i.e.,
less claim coverage) such that it is arguably fair for the Patent Office
to infer that there is no error under the reissue statute and bar the
patentee from pursuing the restricted claims during reissue.
In contrast, the Patent Office's rule barring reissue claims that
could have been pursued in a divisional patent makes no sense when
the courts change the rules for patentable subject matter. In this
situation, the patentee would have no way of foreseeing the need to
pursue a divisional patent for a later change in law during the original
prosecution. There is the requisite error under the reissue statute in
this situation, and the plain language of the reissue statute should
govern to permit the patentee to correct the issued claims to be valid
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
E. Non-Statutory Recapture Rule
Moreover, even for a broadening reissue filed within two years
of issuance the patent owner also faces the problem that correction
during reissue proceedings might be impractical due to the recapture
rule, as enacted by the Patent Office.' 60 The recapture rule is a
judicially-created doctrine that imposes an additional set of non-
statutory restrictions about how claims may be changed during reissue
proceedings.161 That is, despite the broad language of the reissue
statute, the courts have imposed additional restrictions on correcting
patents by reissue, which the Patent Office implements with a set of
160. See generally id. at § 1412.02.
161. See, e.g., Ball Corp v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1435 (1984) (describing the
recapture rule in terms of the statute's "error" requirement).
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procedural rules. 162
The judicial rationale for the recapture rule is to impose
additional principles of equity to limit the manner in which a patent
owner can correct claims during reissue.'6 3 This includes the concept
of estoppel regarding actions taken by the patent owner to get the
patent allowed over prior art rejections. 164 The U.S. patent system is
one in which the Patent Office performs a search of the prior art and
often rejects the initially filed claims on prior art rejections. 165 The
Patent Office then presents the patentee with an opportunity to present
arguments or claim amendments to overcome the prior art
rejections.1 66 For example, if the initially filed claims have feature
"A" and the Patent Office presents a reference having a feature
similar to but not exactly the same as "A," the examiner might issue
an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In this situation the
patentee might amend the claim to include features "A + B" to
overcome the prior art rejections. Alternatively, the patentee could
argue that the claims already include a feature "C" that is not taught
in the reference. Such arguments or claim amendments made to get
the patent allowed over the prior art trigger the recapture rule if the
patentee, in reissue, seeks to broaden the claim scope back to only
feature "A"-the patentee is then said to have "recaptured" subject
matter that was "surrendered" during prosecution of the original
patent.167
The recapture rule thus restricts the patentee from taking a
position in reissue proceedings that is inconsistent with those
arguments and amendments made in the original prosecution to obtain
the issued patent over prior art rejections. Consider, for example, that
the original as-filed claims were for a method of providing a secure
website. The original claims are generally related to providing
encryption-based password techniques for a user to securely use a
website. During examination of the original patent, the Patent Office
finds a reference having a subset of similar features. To obtain
allowance of the claims, the patent owner then adds an additional
limitation for making the website secure against hackers. Under the
recapture rule, the patent owner is considered to have surrendered the
162. See MPEP, supra note 22, at § 1412.02.
163. Ball, 729 F.2d at 1439 n.28.
164. Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein, Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1480-82 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
165. See MPEP, supra note 22, at §§ 704.01, 706.
166. Id. at § 714.
167. Id.
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subject matter of the earlier form of the claim and cannot, during
reissue, merely remove the hacker security limitation, which was
argued as being an important feature that rendered the claim
patentable. As a result, for the case of a reissue application filed
within two years of the date of issuance of the original patent,
recapture of surrendered subject matter is only permitted if the claims
are materially narrowed in other respects.168 Surrendered subject
matter includes subject matter added by amendment or argued during
prosecution to distinguish over the prior art. 169
The recapture rule jurisprudence largely deals with cases in
which the patentee attempted to broaden claims during reissue in
order to dramatically increase the scope of the claims using reissue. In
many of these cases the patent owner could have reasonably foreseen
that adding a particular limitation to overcome the prior art would
limit the scope of the claims.o70 The patent owner could have fought
for claims having a broader scope instead of adding a particular
limitation to overcome a prior art rejection. As such, the recapture
rule restricts and limits the patent owner because of the perceived
unfairness in letting the patent owner use reissue to take a second bite
at the apple to pursue broader claims inconsistent with their positions
in the original prosecution. The Patent Office has thus codified a set
of procedural rules and policies supposedly based on the recapture
rule to prohibit a patentee from obtaining a claim scope through
reissue that was surrendered during prosecution.' 71 In practice many
of these procedural rules are even more restrictive than would appear
to be required under the case law, much less the reissue statute.
However, the recapture jurisprudence does not properly deal
with the equities for a later change in the court's interpretation of
patentable subject matter. A patent owner could not have, at the time
the patent was being examined by the Patent Office, reasonably
foreseen that the courts would at a future date change the rules on
how claims must be written to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
basic rationale of the recapture rule is thus inappropriate for the
situation where a patent owner seeks to use reissue to correct a patent
claim after Bilski for a 35 U.S.C. § 101 issue. The situation is made
168. Id at § 1412.02.
169. Id
170. See, e.g., Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein, Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(noting that"Hester does not explain how the explicit recitation of a spiral conveyance path-
which is present in prior art cookers cited by the examiner during the prosecution of the original
patent-materially narrows these claims").
171. See MPEP, supra note 22, at § 1412.02.
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even worse by the extraordinarily strict interpretation of the recapture
rule by the Patent Office, which provides no exceptions for changes
made to address patentable subject matter issues or changes in law.
The Patent Office's interpretation of the recapture rule is one in
which deleting even a single word of an issued claim may invoke the
recapture doctrine.172 That is, the overall approximate scope of the
claim as a whole is not the test for whether the claim is consistent
with the reissue statute and principles of equity. Additionally, under
the Patent Office's policy, adding limitations from other previously
prosecuted claims (e.g., other issued claims of the patent or other
earlier versions of claims examined by the Patent Office) may not
constitute a material narrowing sufficient to avoid the recapture rule
for a broadened reissue. 173 The Patent Office also has specific policies
barring reissue claims directed to subject matter cancelled in the
original prosecution.1 74 The combination of all of these rules creates a
procedural "straightjacket" making it hard to amend claims during
reissue. Additionally, in the authors' experience, a patent owner can
spend years fighting dubious recapture rejections, thereby increasing
the number of years that the patent remains languishing in reissue
proceedings. 175
The recapture rule applied by the Patent Office is grossly unfair
to patent owners in the context of a reissue application filed to address
changes in law by the courts for patentable subject matter. The
recapture rule, as interpreted by the Patent Office, ignores the fact that
the specific claim language that is argued to be patentable over the
prior art in the original prosecution is also determined by Patent
Office policies on indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Consider, as
an example, a patent application filed in 2001 when State Street
governed patentable subject matter. Suppose that a method claim was
filed for a method of utilizing a processor including a limitation for:
"adjusting a processor based on an alarm limit condition." The Patent
Office then issues a series of rejections for both indefiniteness and
172. Id. at § 1412.03(1) ("A broadened reissue claim is a claim which enlarges the scope of
the claims of the patent, i.e., a claim which is greater in scope than each and every claim of the
original patent").
173. See MPEP, supra note 22, at § 1412.02() ("we determine whether the reissue claims
were materially narrowed in other respects, so that the claims may not have been enlarged, and
hence avoid the recapture rule").
174. See id at § 1412.02(l)(B)(1).
175. See In re Mostafazadeh, No. 10-1260, appeal docketed (Fed. Cir. Mar. 24, 2010)
(U.S. Patent Appl. No. 10/016,750 (filed Dec. 10, 2001), Office Action (Dec. 16, 2009)).
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also prior art rejections.' 76 Here, let us assume that the examiner
states that it is unclear in the original claim how the processor is
adjusted and requires the patentee to correct the claim and suggests
revising the claim language to "performing an adjustment of an alarm
condition based on an alarm signal." The patent owner then makes the
suggested correction in an amendment and argues the patentability of
the claim over the prior art, such as stating on the record that the prior
art does not teach "performing an adjustment of an alarm condition
based on an alarm signal." In this example, the patentee was advised
by the Patent Office to remove a machine limitation in favor of
another limitation to clarify the claim language. The patent owner
then subsequently argues the new language in arguing the
patentability of the claim over the prior art. The recapture doctrine
could bar the patentee in reissue from revising the claim language in
favor of a processor limitation to satisfy the later "machine-or-
transformation" test of the 2008 Federal Circuit Bilski decision.
The recapture doctrine applied by the Patent Office also ignores
the fact that the specific language chosen by the patentee at the time a
patent is filed is determined by the safer harbor guidelines of the
Patent Office. For example, Patent Office guidelines in 2001 stated
that one of the "safe harbors" was that "when the method, as claimed,
produces a concrete, tangible, and useful result; i.e., the method
recites a step or act of producing something that is concrete, tangible,
and useful." 177 Suppose that a patent is filed with limitation "z"
because "z" is a safe harbor for patentable subject matter under
existing Patent Office guidelines when the patent is filed (like the
"useful, concrete and tangible" test). The patent owner then argues
that the claims, including element "z", are patentable over the prior
art. The recapture doctrine then applies to limitation "z" during
reissue proceedings, even if the law of patentable subject matter has
subsequently changed (by, say, Bilski), and even though the only
purpose of originally including it was because it was a safe-harbor
example provided by the Patent Office when the patent was in
prosecution.
Another problem with the recapture doctrine applied by the
Patent Office is that it ignores the fact that a patentee, acting under the
safe harbors provided by the Patent Office, may assume that it is safe
176. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (noting that an indefiniteness rejection is a rejection that a
claim's language is unclear).
177. See MPEP, supra note 22, at § 2106(IV)(C)(2)(B)(2).
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to cancel a subset of claims that are rejected. 17 8 As an illustrative
example, suppose that a patent is allowed in 2004, under the State
Street regime. During this time, the useful, concrete, and tangible test
was a safe harbor. Suppose a subset of the claims includes a processor
limitation that is rejected by the Patent Office, while a large number
of other claims are allowed that do not have a processor limitation.
The patent owner might safely assume that they can cancel the small
number of rejected processor claims rather than spend more time and
resources trying to get every claim allowed. The rejection may even
be improper, but it takes time and money to fight Patent Office claim
rejections. If the patent owner was unlucky enough to have cancelled
those rejected processor claims to get their patent allowed, they have
arguably surrendered the machine or processor limitations under the
recapture doctrine.179 Thus, in reissue proceedings, the patentee could
face recapture rejections if they attempted to correct the patent to tie
the process claims to a specific machine to satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test, which is still an important clue to patentability
under the new Bilski regime.' 8 0 What this could mean in practice is a
complete inability in the worst case to correct the claims.
The current legal environment is thus at a crisis when it comes to
patent correction. Under 35 U.S.C. § 251, there is bright line law that
expressly permits liberal correction of issued patents, and there is
Supreme Court jurisprudence, stretching back to Justice Marshall in
1832, informing us that reissue should be liberally permitted to
correct issued patents because "that sense of justice and of right
which all feel, pleads strongly against depriving the inventor of the
compensation thus solemnly promised."i 8i Yet, as a practical matter,
the reissue procedures cannot be used in an effective manner to
address the changing definitions of patentable subject matter. Patent
Office procedures are simply too slow and encumbered with too many
additional layers of restrictive rules. The patent owner that attempts
patent correction via reissue to address Bilski risks destroying the
value of their patent during the five or more years that reissue
proceedings drag on. In the worst case, they could find the patent is
uncorrectable due to the Patent Office's inflexible application of the
178. See id. at § 2106 (listing USPTO rules for patentable subject matter). Patent
applicants relying on safe harbors created by the USPTO may later regret canceling claims
relying on those safe harbors, should the Supreme Court or Federal Circuit change or reverse
current policies.
179. Id. at § 1412.02.
180. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
181. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1832).
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recapture rule and lose the entire patent. This is clearly a crisis for
anyone that believes that 35 U.S.C. § 251 should be read to provide
broad relief to correct issued patents, particularly when the courts
change the rules of the game after a patent has been granted.
VI. DO THE PATENT OFFICE'S REISSUE PROCEDURES
CONSTITUTE A REGULATORY TAKING?
As described above, the USPTO reissue procedures thwart the
equitable purposes of the reissue statute; but do these procedures
erode the value of patents to such an extent that the procedures
amount to a regulatory taking?
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."l 82 The Supreme Court introduced the regulatory
takings doctrine in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.'83 Mahon dealt
with Pennsylvania's Kohler Act, which prohibited coal mining
underneath property belonging to someone else in such a way as to
cause the subsidence of, inter alia, any structure used as a human
habitation.184 In Mahon, Mrs. Mahon owned the surface rights to a
tract of land, but the Pennsylvania Coal Co. owned the coal
underneath Mahon's land.' 85 The Supreme Court denied Mahon's suit
for an injunction when the coal company sought to extract the coal,
holding that the Kohler Act was a taking because it "[went] too far" in
regulating the extraction of coal.186 The Court explained that the Act
made it "commercially impracticable" to mine certain coal.187
The Court further refined the doctrine in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City ofNew York, establishing an ad hoc factual
inquiry in which courts must analyze the character of the government
action. For instance, physical invasions are more likely to be found
to be a taking than when "some public program adjust[s] the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."' 89 In
addition, the Court noted that a taking is more likely to be found when
a government regulation frustrates the property owners' investment-
182. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
183. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also STEVEN J.
EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 1, 5 (4th ed. 2009).
184. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 415.
187. Id. at 414-15.
188. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
189. Id. at 124.
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backed expectations.' 90 Refining this analysis, the Supreme Court in
Agins v. City of Tiburon stated that just compensation is required
when a regulation deprives the owner of all "economically viable use
of his land."'91 Moreover, a regulation that is merely a temporary
deprivation of all economically viable use of property does not
categorically rise to the level of a taking, but the Court has
acknowledged that delays could conceivably last long enough to
"interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations."l 92
There is, however, considerable debate about whether the
Takings Clause applies to patents. 193 In Zoltek Corp. v. United States,
the Federal Circuit held that patent infringement by the government
does not constitute a taking of private property actionable under the
Tucker Act. 94 At least one commentator, however, has pointed out
that longtime Supreme Court precedent has historically treated patents
as private property, and that patents are therefore subject to the
Takings Clause.'9 Still, the applicability of the Takings Clause to
patents will remain uncertain until the Supreme Court specifically
addresses the issue.
In any event, the reissue crisis is distinguishable from Zoltek.
Whereas Zoltek dealt with economic losses caused by government
infringement of a particular patent in one specific case,196 the
USPTO's slow and restrictive reissue procedures have the potential to
unnecessarily diminish or even wipe out all economic value of some
particular patents. This effectively frustrates patentees' reasonable
expectations that the reissue statute should permit patentees to quickly
and liberally correct issued patents to restore the maximum value
permitted under the reissue statute after a change in the courts'
jurisprudence on patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court has
even used language similar to that in its takings jurisprudence when
discussing sudden changes to the patent laws. As Justice Kennedy
noted in Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, "courts must be
190. Id.
191. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see also Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
192. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 341-42 (2002).
193. See generally Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007); J.
Nicholas Bunch, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1747 (2005).
194. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rehearing en banc
denied, 464 F.3d 1335.
195. See generally Mossoff, supra note 193.
196. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1352-53.
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cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations
of the inventing community"l 9 7 (emphasis added). Indeed, "[t]o
change so substantially the rules of the game now could very well
subvert the various balances the PTO sought to strike when issuing
the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be
affected by our decision."198
Consider the investment-backed expectations of a high-tech
company. High-tech companies depend on patents as part of their
investor-backed growth strategies. If all of a patent's claims are
suddenly invalidated by a change of law, then all of that patent's
value has been completely destroyed. Changes in the courts'
definition of patentable subject matter may, in some cases, deprive the
patent owner of the entire value of their patent. As noted above, for
many patents, reissue is impractical due to the recapture rule or
aspects of the Patent Office's rules and procedures. For these patents,
the entire value of the patent may be lost forever due to a change in
law regarding patentable subject matter.
As one example, consider a company that was started some time
ago and now has a portfolio of issued patents. As with many tech
companies, the company has changed business directions and now
desires to sell off part of its patent portfolio not directed to its core
business. The company spent millions of dollars in R&D. Now it
desires to recoup part of its previous R&D investments by selling off
a portion of its patent portfolio. In this example, the resale value of
the patents may be negligible due to the change in the courts'
definition of patentable subject matter and the impracticality or
impossibility of correcting the patents. Here, the company's
reasonable expectation that its patents could be sold to recoup past
R&D investments is frustrated.
For patents that are correctable under the reissue statute, some
aspects of the patent's value might eventually be restored through
filing a reissue application under the reissue statute.199 If the claims
emerge from reissue with substantially the same claim scope, then
rights to past damages will not be lost. The value of a patent includes
197. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)
(emphasis added).
198. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739 (quoting Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Warner-Jenkinson, 520
U.S. at 41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The new presumption, if applied woodenly, might in
some instances unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice at the time of
patent prosecution that such a presumption would apply.").
199. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
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many aspects. Consider as another example a startup company that
has one issued patent to protect its core business for a revolutionary
new technology. That patent may be used for many purposes. It can
be used to help attract additional rounds of venture financing. The
patent can be used as a defensive bargaining chip if the startup
company is sued by a larger company. That is, if the startup company
is sued for patent infringement, it can file a countersuit with its own
patent to try to force a reasonable settlement. The patent may also be
used to improve the valuation of the company in merger or
acquisition talks. Additionally, the patent might be sold or licensed to
raise money if the company runs low on funds. During reissue
proceedings, however, many uses of the patent are frustrated, such as
using the existence of an issued, valid patent with broad enforceable
claims to help raise venture financing or dissuade rival companies
from suing the startup. Also, the filing of a reissue application will
likely make it difficult to license or sell the patent at its previous
value during the reissue proceedings. Thus, while reissue may be
theoretically possible in this example, the company could lose out on
many of the traditional expected uses of the patent during the five-to-
ten year period that the patent spends in reissue proceedings. In that
sense, even if reissue is possible, the company's reasonable
investment backed expectations are frustrated.
To the degree that the USPTO's procedures unreasonably inhibit
patentees from effectively correcting their patents in a reasonable time
period, then that is arguably a regulatory taking by the USPTO.2 00
And given the finite patent term length and the slow reissue process,
the delays incurred in reissue are often permanent-not temporary-
delays. 20 ' The undue delays in prosecution of reissue applications, the
risk of litigation estoppel from complying with the oath requirement,
the loss of damages because of the "substantially identical" statutory
element, the impracticality of non-statutory rules, and the rigid
application of the recapture doctrine are all procedures implemented
by the USPTO (and also the courts in the case of recapture) that could
result in the complete elimination of a patent's value. In many cases,
this would greatly frustrate patentees' "investment-backed
200. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 341-42 (2002) (declining to find a taking because the trial court did not conclude that
the delay in formulating a regulatory plan was unreasonable).
201. See id. (noting that a taking is more likely to be found where the deprivation of
property is permanent; although, unreasonable temporary delays may also be takings if they
frustrate investment-backed expectations).
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expectations. "202
If the patentee is unable to effectively correct the legal error
made without deceptive intent in contravention of the purposes of the
reissue statute, or if the reissue procedures unfairly result in an
unenforceable patent, then the patentee should be entitled to just
compensation. Given these serious problems, the authors urge the
PTO, Congress, and the courts to revise their reissue practices to
remedy these inequities.
VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PATENT CORRECTION
CRISIS
As described above, the patent system is at a crisis point in that
many patent owners will not be able to use reissue to maintain the
value of their issued patents in light of changes in the courts'
patentable subject matter jurisprudence. What can be done to address
the current crisis in patent correction? One option is for the Patent
Office to change its practices with respect to reissue proceedings.
Reissue proceeding are exceedingly slow and do not have a dedicated
examination unit. In contrast, reexamination proceedings in the Patent
Office are conducted with special dispatch 2 03 and are examined by a
special examination unit that specializes in reexamination.20 4 As a
result, the average pendency in ex parte reexamination is between two
to four years,205 or about two years less than the pendency of reissue
proceedings. There is no reason why a reissue proceeding cannot be
conducted in a similar manner to reduce the pendency of reissue
proceedings to a more reasonable length of time.
Another option would be for the courts and the Patent Office to
relax the application of non-statutory rules for the special case of
using reissue to amend claims to comply with a change in the courts'
jurisprudence on patentable subject matter that occurs after a patent
has issued, i.e., for this special situation to permit reissue to the fullest
extent permissible under the reissue statute. Future changes in law by
the courts on patentable subject matter cannot be reasonably foreseen
during the prosecution of a patent, making it unfair to the patent
owner to impose the additional non-statutory restrictions of the Patent
202. See id
203. See MPEP, supra note 22, at § 2209.
204. Id. at § 2233.
205. Robert G. Sterne, Guest Post: Hot Topics in U.S. Patent Reexamination, PATENTLY-
o BLOG (March 10, 2009, 7:49 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/guest-post-hot-
topics-in-us-patent-reexamination.html.
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Office and the recapture rule. When there has been a change in law by
the courts, the literal language of the reissue statute should govern to
permit liberal leave to amend the claims to address 35 U.S.C. § 101
issues, even if that requires revising claim language that is
surrendered under the current interpretation of the recapture rule or
adding claim language that would ordinarily not comport with other
non-statutory Patent Office rules. Moreover, when there has been a
change in law, the claim scope as a whole should be examined to
make sure that the claims are not unduly enlarged to give the patent
owner greater flexibility to revise claim language.
Still yet another option would be to relax the standard for patent
owners to collect past damages for reissue claims when the only
changes made to the claims are to address changes in law for
patentable subject matter unrelated to prior art issues. Under the
current legal regime a patent owner faces the concern that even
adding a single machine element into a process claim to satisfy the
machine-or-transformation test may be found to narrow the scope of
the claim enough to lose rights to all past damages.20 6 A special
exception could be carved out providing specific safe harbor
exceptions for minimal corrections made to satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test or other safe harbor tests that the courts may
develop for determining patentable subject matter under Bilski.
Alternately, the courts could develop an equitable framework to
permit the collection of past damages for corrections made to add
elements that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand are
implicitly included in the claim or otherwise required to practice the
claim.
Finally, Congress could amend the pending Patent Reform Act to
explicitly liberalize the correction procedures through reissue.207
Legislators could add language to §§ 251-252 providing special,
liberal rules for reissue applications filed in response to changes in the
interpretation of the Patent Act by the courts. The Patent Reform Act
could also create a faster mechanism for reviewing reissue
applications that merely seek to respond to changes of the law,
particularly for changes to the law of patentable subject matter.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's holding in Bilski signals yet
another change in the Court's definition of patentable subject matter.
206. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2006); see also discussion supra Part V.B.
207. See generally The Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Bilski affects a wide variety of patents, not just dubious business
method patents. The unexpected result of Bilski is that the patents of
even widely admired companies are potentially at risk. Unfortunately,
patent owners are not able to obtain the intended relief promised by
the reissue statute, creating a problem for patent owners. This article
proposes changes that should be made by the courts and the Patent
Office to permit a patent owner to liberally and speedily correct their
patent and obtain past damages to the fullest extent possible under 35
U.S.C. §§ 251-252 whenever the courts change the definition of
patentable subject matter.
* *
